Abstract. In this paper we present a mechanism to de ne names for proof-witnesses of formulae and thus to use Gentzen's cut-rule in logic programming. We consider a program to be a set of logical formulae together with a list of such de nitions. Occurrences of the de ned names guide the proof-search by indicating when an instance of the cut-rule should be attempted. By using the cut-rule there are proofs that can be made dramatically shorter. We explain how this idea of using the cut-rule can be applied to the logic of hereditary Harrop formulae.
Introduction
The computation mechanisms both for logic and for functional programming are searches for cut-free proofs. First, in pure logic programming the achievement of a goal G w.r.t. a program P can be seen 1 as the search for a proof in Gentzen's intuitionistic sequent calculus LJ Gen69], of the sequent P ) G, that by Gentzen's cut-elimination theorem can be cut-free Bee89] , Mil90]; a -term found as a witness to a proof contains among other things the answer substitution. Second, the conventional view of functional programming, as in Tho91] , is that one constructs a sequence of de nitions and an expression to be evaluated; the evaluation of the expression is done by replacing the de nienda by their de nientia and subsequent normalisation. By the Curry-Howard correspondence between types and propositions, the evaluation of expressions in functional programming corresponds to the normalisation of proofs in Gentzen's natural deduction system NJ. So, both processes yield cut-free proofs, using \cut-free" rst in the sequent calculus sense and second in the natural deduction sense.
From a type-theoretic point of view ML84], Tho91] , in logic programming we give a speci cation (goal formula) and we want to nd an object meeting that speci cation, and in functional programming we give a speci cation (type) and an object (the expression to be evaluated) meeting the speci cation and we want to transform the object into another object in normal form meeting the speci cation.
If we were to allow the cut-rule in proof-search some formulae would have much shorter proofs. For example, in Boo84] it is shown that there are formulae whose shortest cut-free proofs are exponentially longer than their shortest proofs using instances of the cut-rule. The problem of using the cut-rule is to decide when and how the cut-rule should be applied; in other words, what are the adequate lemmas to use in proving a theorem. The lemmas are usually established based on experience. In programming, we do not expect to establish lemmas during the proof-search. Instead we expect the programmer to know what lemmas may be useful and de ne names for the proofs of these lemmas. Then, during the search for a proof of a formula we can use these formulae previously established without having to prove them several times. As a result of proof-search in this framework we can obtain proofs with instances of the cut-rule; if required cut-elimination can be applied. Although we allow for instances of the cut-rule during the search for a proof, proof-search can still be e cient since the application of the cut-rule only needs to be attempted in particular circumstances, to be described in full below. Brie y, the cutrule is attempted if there is an occurrence of a de ned name in the goal in which case the type of the de ned name is used as cut formula.
In our system we have two layers of typed objects. On one layer the objects are -terms with constants and their types are the simple types of Church's theory of types. On the other layer the objects are proofwitnesses and their types are logical formulae. Terms may occur both in proof-witnesses and logical formulae but occurrences of proof-witnesses in the logical formulae are not allowed. This paper is organized as follows. We start by introducing the underlying language of typed -calculus with constants and by presenting the calculus LJ a for intuitionistic logic with proof-witnesses annotating the formulae. Next, we describe the idea of using de nitions to control the proof-search and we apply this idea to the logic of hereditary Harrop formulae. An example of how this technique may be used to nd shorter proofs follows. Finally we mention other related works and present some concluding remarks.
Logical Preliminaries
We will introduce the underlying language of typed -calculus with constants based on Mil90]. Let us consider a type system with a set S of primitive types. We assume the symbol o, the type of propositions, to be a member of S. The set of types is the closure of S under the formation of function types. The constructor of function types is denoted by ! and it associates to the right. The symbols ; 0 ; ::: are used to denote arbitrary types. Any type can be written as 1 ! ::: ! n ! 0 , where 0 is a primitive type. In the particular case where n = 0 the type is just 0 .
We assume there is a set C of typed constants of and a set X of denumerably many variables of each type. We also assume there is a set A, Let be a signature. A -term is a term all of whose symbols occurring freely are members of ; in other words, a -term is a closed term all of whose constants and parameters are in . A -formula is a formula all of whose nonlogical constants occurring freely are members of .
Let U be a denumerable set, whose members W; W 1 ; W 2 ; ::: we call dummies. Let R be a denumerable set, whose members r; r 1 ; r 2 ; ::: we call abstract realisers.
The set w of proof-witnesses is inductively de ned as follows:
w ::= 1 w j 2 w j hw; wi j inl w j inr w j r j when www j ww j r:w j ht; wi j wt j a:w j let r = w in w j let a = 1 r in w j W; where r ranges over R, a ranges over A, W ranges over U and t ranges over closed terms. We use w; w 1 ; w 2 ; ::: to write proof-witnesses.
An occurrence of a parameter a in a proof-witness is free if it is not in the scope of a or let a; it is bound otherwise. Let be a signature. A proof-witness w is a -proof-witness if all its constants are in and if all the parameters occurring freely in w are also in . 1. in the axiom, A is an atomic formula; 2. in^) and _ ), r1 and r2 are new abstract realisers; 3. in ), r1 is a new abstract realiser; 4. in ) 9, t is a -term of type ; 5. in ) 8, a is a new parameter; 6. in 9 ), a is a new parameter and r1 is a new abstract realiser; 7. in 8 ), t is a -term of type and r1 is a new abstract realiser; 8. in cut, r does not occur in ?, 9. in conv, A 0 1 ; :::; A 0 n ; A 0 are -convertible to A1; :::;An; A respectively. that will be exponentially longer than if they were built up by using the cut-rule. The problem of using the cut-rule is that it does not preserve the subformula property since the cut formula, the formula B in the cut-rule of LJ a , might not occur in the conclusion sequent and so, proof-search is di cult. Usually in logic programming a program is a set or a list of logical formulae. In our approach we consider a program to be a set of logical formulae together with a list of de nitions. The names being de ned in the list of de nitions will guide the search for a proof since they will be responsible for triggering instances of the cut-rule. The cut-rule is applied only in case there is an occurrence of a de ned name in the goal formula. In this case the cut-rule is applied and the cut formula is the type of the de ned name. Below, we explain how this idea of using the cut-rule can be applied to the logic of rst-order hereditary Harrop formulae, for which uniform proofs are complete as shown in MNPS91], and thus e cient proof-search strategies can be devised.
The 2 set H of rst-order hereditary Harrop formulae 3 is inductively de ned by:
where the meta-variable A ranges over the set of rst-order atomic formulae and ranges over the set of primitive types di erent from o. We de ne the set I of I-formulae as:
where the meta-variable A ranges over the set of rst-order atomic formulae and ranges over the set of primitive types di erent from o. The set of I-formulae is the intersection of the sets of H-and G-formulae. A formula is called a C(ut)-formula if it has the form 9 f 1 : 1 :::9 fn: n I; where 1 ; :::; n are arbitrary types and I is an I-formula.
Let be a signature. The set of H-formulae is the set of allformulae that are also H-formulae. Likewise we de ne the sets of Gformulae and C-formulae.
Let D be a set, whose members d; d 1 ; d 2 ; ::: we call de ned names. We extend the de nition of -proof-witnesses by allowing proof-witnesses to be built up also from de ned names, i.e. w ::= 1 w j 2 w j hw; wi j inl w j inr w j s j when www j ww j r:w j ht; wi j wt j a:w j let s = w in w j let a = 1 s in w j W; where s ranges over R D.
A proof-witness of a C-formula has the form ht 1 ; ht 2 ; :::ht n ; wi:::ii. If The inference rules of Fig. 4 If there is a de ned name d occurring in the goal and there is a de nition d = def w : C in the list of de nitions we apply the cut-rule and we mark this de nition as used so that no other applications of the cut-rule are attempted with this de nition. We keep applying the cut-rule until no further applications are possible. Next, we apply 9) until no further applications of 9) are possible. At this point all the formulae in the antecedent are H-formulae so we proceed by backchaining as usual, i.e. roughly speaking we proceed by breaking up the conjunctions on the left and by unifying the goal formula with the heads of program formulae starting with the formulae that were originated from cut formulae.
Example
The example presented below is based on an example given in Boo84] to show that cut-free proofs may be exponentially longer than proofs using instances of the cut-rule. Consider we want to prove in LJ a the goal L(( x:cx(c11))(( x:cx(c11))1)) w.r.t. the program ? using a uniform proof. Figure 6 shows a uniform proof of this goal together with the instantiations of the dummy proofwitnesses. After performing all substitutions, we obtain for the dummy ; ? ) W7 : L1 axiom ; ? ) W6 : L(c11)`P ; ? ) W5 : L(c(c11)1) ; ? ) W4 : L(c1(c11))`P`P ; ? ) W3 : L(c(c1(c11))1)`P ; ? ) W2 : L(c(c(c1(c11))1)1)`P ; ? ) W1 : L(c(c1(c11))(c11))`P ; ? ) W1 : L(( x:cx(c11))(c1(c11))) conv ; ? ) W1 : L(( x:cx(c11))(( x:cx(c11))1)) conv
The instantiations for the dummy proof-witnesses are: W1 7 ! r2(c1(c11))11W2; W2 7 ! r3(c(c1(c11))1)W3; W3 7 ! r3(c1(c11))W4; W4 7 ! r2111W5; W5 7 ! r3(c11)W6; W6 7 ! r31W7; W7 7 ! r1; proof-witness W 1 the proof-witness r 2 (c1(c11))11(r 3 (c(c1(c11))1)(r 3 (c1(c11))(r 2 111(r 3 (c11)(r 3 1r 1 ))))):
In this proof the sequence of inferences shown in Fig. 7 , for appropriate instantiations of , occurs twice. If we had used the cut-rule with cut formula 8 x: (Lx L(cx(c11))) we would have needed to prove the sequence of inferences in Fig. 7 only once. We will now show how to construct a proof of this goal using instances of the cut-rule as we explained before. Let be the list whose only member is the de nition ca1)(r 3 ar 4 ) )i : 9 f: ! 8 x: (Lx L(fx)):
A proof of the well-formedness of the basis ; ; ? can be obtained by combining the axiom`w fb ; hi; ? with the proof presented in Fig. 8 . By using the de ned name + 2 we rewrite the goal L(( x:cx(c11))(( x:cx(c11))1)) into L( 1 + 2 ( 1 + 2 1)), where for brevity we drop the types in E-expressions. Now we show how to construct a proof of the sequent ; ; ? ) W : L( 1 + 2 ( 1 + 2 1)), where W is a dummy proof-witness, by applying the proof-strategy described in the previous section. The occurrence of the de ned name + 2 in the atomic goal triggers an instance of the cut-rule with its type being the cut formula to be used. We look up the list of de ned names and we nd the type 9 f: ! 8 x: (Lx L(fx)) for the name + 2 . We apply the cut-rule and we have now to prove the sequent:
(i) ; ; + 2 : 9 f: ! 8 x (Lx L(fx)); ? ) W 1 : L( 1 + 2 ( 1 + 2 1)):
As a consequence of applying the cut-rule the proof-witness W is instantiated with let + 2 = h x:cx(c11); a: r 4 :r 2 a11(r 3 (ca1)(r 3 ar 4 ))i in W 1 :
fa : g; hi;r4 : La; ? ) r4 : La axiom fa : g; hi;r4 : La; ? ) r3ar4 : L(ca1)`P fa : g;hi;r4 : La; ? ) r3(ca1)(r3ar4) : L(c(ca1)1)`P fa : g; hi;r4 : La; ? ) r2a11(r3(ca1)(r3ar4)) : L(ca(c11))`P fa : g; hi;r4 : La; ? ) r2a11(r3(ca1)(r3ar4)) : L(( x:cx(c11))a) conv fa : g;hi;? ) r4:r2a11(r3(ca1)(r3ar4)) : La L(( x:cx(c11))a) ; hi;? ) a: r4:r2a11(r3(ca1)(r3ar4)) : 8x: (Lx L(( x:cx(c11))x)) ) 8 ; hi;? ) h x:cx(c11); a: r4:r2a11(r3(ca1)(r3ar4))i : 9f: ! 8x: (Lx L(fx)) ) 9 In this proof, we start by replacing in the cut formula the symbol f by the term 1 + 2 . Then we use the cut formula twice to simplify the goal and we are left with an axiom sequent.
; ; 2+2 : 8x: (Lx L( 1 +2 x) Replacing all the dummy proof-witnesses by their instantiations we obtain for the initial goal L( 1 + 2 ( 1 + 2 1)) the proof-witness let + 2 = h x:cx(c11); a: r 4 :r 2 a11(r 3 (ca1)(r 3 ar 4 ))i in 2 + 2 ( 1 + 2 1( 2 + 2 1r 1 )):
One of the consequences of the Curry-Howard correspondence between types and propositions is the relation between normalisation and cutelimination. For if we normalise the proof-witness we obtained for the goal L( 1 + 2 ( 1 + 2 1)) we obtain the term r 2 (c1(c11))11(r 3 (c(c1(c11))1)(r 3 (c1(c11))(r 2 111(r 3 (c11)(r 3 1r 1 )))));
which is a witness for a cut-free proof of L(( x:cx(c11))( x:cx(c11))1)).
In fact this proof-witness is the same as the proof-witness we obtained for the uniform proof of Fig. 6 .
Related and Future Work
The typed logic programming language Prolog NM88] is based on the logic of higher-order hereditary Harrop formulae for which uniform proofs are complete, as shown in MNPS91]. It supports modular programming, abstract data types and higher-order functions and predicates. We showed how to extend the logic of rst-order hereditary Harrop formulae to have de nitions of names to control the applications of the cut-rule. We intend to look at the possibility of having non-hereditary Harrop formulae in a program provided they are paired with a proof-witness that would guide the application of left introduction rules. In fact this problem arises if we try to extend the set of formulae we allowed as cut formulae in the setting of rst-order hereditary Harrop formulae. Two di erent views of logic programming based on the system of dependent types LF HHP87] are given in Pfe91] and in Pym90].
Elf Pfe91], Pfe92] is a logic programming language based on types through the propositions-as-types correspondence. Achieving a goal (type) G w.r.t. a program (context) ? corresponds to a search for a closed object M of type G, where the language is determined by a signature such that ?` M : G is provable in a natural deduction formulation of LF.
The answer to a query is not only a substitution for the free variables but a term of query type. Elf has two sorts of incompleteness w.r.t. LF, one due to the use of a depth-rst search and the other caused by the undecidability of uni cation for the de nitional equality used in LF. As in our work, in Elf computation corresponds to a search for an object of query type, but whereas in our case we search for a proof in a sequent calculus, Elf searches for a natural deduction proof. A major di erence between Elf and our work is that in Elf a program is solely a list of type assignments to variables; in our proposal a program is also allowed to contain de nitions, where a new variable is introduced as a name for an expression of a certain type.
In The resulting mapping being what one normally calls answer substitution in logic programming. Although proof-search is carried out in a sequent calculus that allows cut-elimination a search for a proof does not involve uses of the cut-rule. A Curry-Howard correspondence between a fragment of propositional intuitionistic sequent calculus and a programming language, where evaluation in the programming language corresponds to cut-elimination in the sequent calculus, is presented in Wad93]. Evaluation in this programming language is di erent from evaluation in the programming language obtained by composing a translation of sequent calculus into natural deduction with the Curry-Howard correspondence between natural deduction and -calculus. In our work term assignment is done through this composition of a translation of sequent calculus into natural deduction with the Curry-Howard correspondence. In future work we intend to use a term assignment similar to the one described in Wad93] and investigate what di erent evaluation mechanisms can be obtained from di erent algorithms to perform cut-elimination.
In PW92] it is suggested that in logic programming the achievement of a goal w.r.t. a program can be usefully divided into two phases: the rst being proof-search and the second being answer extraction. This idea was considered for cut-free systems. In fact the same idea can be applied to systems with cut-rule. For example, the two phases might be (i) the search for a proof-witness of a goal in a system with the cut-rule; (ii) the extraction of all the terms used to replace existentially quanti ed variables in the goal and subsequent normalisation of these terms, thus avoiding the normalisation of the entire proof-witness.
An analysis of logic programs as types in the sense of the CurryHoward correspondence is given in Lip92]. A logic program is transformed into an equational speci cation over the term model by exploiting a uniformity in the predicates and parameters in the program. A program is written as a realisability goal and there is a search for a function that returns a proof-witness for every choice of parameters. This mechanism of synthesising functions can be seen as a way of generating automatically cut formulae. For it should be possible to employ the idea of using de nitions to guide the proof-search by de ning names for the synthesised functions.
Deliverables MB93] are proof-witnesses hf; wi of formulae of the form 9 x: 1 !:::! n F, where 1 ; :::; n are primitive types di erent from o and F is a formula. In MB93] it is argued that deliverables are the products a software house should deliver to its customers, i.e. a program f and a proof w that the program meets the original speci cation F. Elsewhere Pin] we exploit the idea of using de nitions to control the applications of the cut-rule to give a proof-theoretic semantics to integrate logic and functional programming by de ning names for deliverables.
The language LeFun, as presented in AKN89], is a programming language that integrates logic and functional programming. In this language a program is a list of logical formulae together with a list of de nitions. A de nition in LeFun has the form name = def -term, thus leaving out the speci cation the -term satis es as well as a proof-witness for that. The computation mechanism is called residuation, which is a mechanism to delay uni cation until the arguments of functions are fully instantiated. In forthcoming work we expect to make precise the relation of LeFun with the proof-theoretic semantics to integrate logic and functional programming based on the idea of using names to guide the proof-search.
Conclusions
There are proofs that can be exponentially shorter if they are allowed to use the cut-rule. The problem of automating proof-search in a calculus with a cut-rule is that we may apply the cut-rule to any sequent and once we have decided to apply the cut-rule we still have the freedom of applying the cut-rule with any formula as cut formula. Our idea of using de nitions to guide the proof-search restricts the cut-rule in such a way that its application is allowed only in case there is a de ned name occurring in the goal formula, and in this case we only attempt the cutrule with the type of the de ned name as cut formula. Thus, we can have a goal-directed proof-search that in some cases will nd proofs exponentially shorter than we would nd with a cut-free search procedure.
